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NSC FOR LOOK  
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019  
TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)  
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):  
(U) RUSSIAN COMMENTARY DOCUMENT, OCTOBER 27, 2009

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States  
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-021.

[1](#)2. (S) The text in paragraph 3 is the official translation of a Russian paper that was provided by Amb Antonov to A/S Gottemoeller at a U.S.-hosted lunch on October 22, 2009. The paper reflects Russian commentary on their rationale for not including various prohibitions included under the START Treaty, but not included in their proposal for the START Follow-on Treaty.

[1](#)3. (S) Begin text:

Official Translation

Russian document  
SFO - VI  
Geneva  
October 27, 2009

#### Article V

The following provisions are not included:

Paragraph 4.

a ban on locating deployed ICBM silo launchers outside of ICBM silo launcher bases.

Commentary. The Russian side, just like the US side, locates deployed ICBM silo launchers only at ICBM bases.

Moreover, in the Russian draft of the new treaty, it is stated (paragraph 1 Article V): Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty only at: ICBM bases, submarine bases, air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test ranges.

In this connection, the inclusion of a provision "about a ban on locating deployed ICBM silo launchers outside of bases for ICBM silo launchers" in paragraph 4, Article V is not effective, since it is superfluous.

Paragraph 5.

a ban on conducting flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, equipped with reentry vehicles, from Space Launch Facilities

Commentary. The Russian side does not plan to have "Space Launch Facilities." We proposed uniting into one concept, a "space launch facility" and "test range," and we are leaving in the new agreement only "test range," since these concepts are practically identical. That step by the Russian side is aimed at simplifying the Treaty and expanding confidence building, transparency, and verification measures. Here, we are taking into consideration that a "test range," unlike a "space launch facility" is subject to inspections. Preceding from this premise, it is proposed to put both the Plesetsk Cosmodrome and the Cape Canaveral Space Launch Complex in the category of a "test range."

Paragraph 7.

a ban on the production, testing, deployment and the use of rapid reload assets.

Commentary. The Russian side, in leaving out the given provision from the new Treaty, first of all, preceded from the fact that the sides do not have and do not foresee having such assets in the future. As long as the START Treaty was in effect, such assets were neither developed nor deployed by either the Russian or US sides. In this connection, the given provision is superfluous.

Paragraph 8.

a ban on the production, testing and deployment of:

- Ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers (launched from waterborne platforms, other than submarines);
- Ballistic missiles or cruise missiles emplaced on or tethered to the ocean floor or moving only in contact with the ocean floor, etc.
- Any kind of WMD for launch into near earth orbit;
- Ballistic missiles of the Class "air-surface" (ASBM);
- Long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with more than one warhead.

Commentary. Some of the restrictions listed above have already been reflected in various treaties and agreements. For example, launching WMDs into near earth orbit is banned by the "Treaty on Outer Space" of 1968, and the emplacement of ballistic missiles on the ocean floor is banned by the 1969 "Convention on the Sea Bed."

Moreover, pursuant to paragraph 3, Article VI (sic) (VII) of the Russian draft of the new treaty "each Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for placing a payload, other than any kind of weapon, into space or the upper atmosphere."

Likewise, the Russian version of the new agreement (paragraph 3 Article IV (sic)) provides that the question of

all newly developed weapons, which, in the opinion of the other side, can be SOAs are subject to discussion at the BCC (for example, just like the JCIC considered issues concerning the prototype of the RS 24 ICBM.)

Paragraph 9.

The possibility (by agreement) to waive bans on conducting launches of ICBMs or SLBMs used as space launch vehicles from waterborne platforms other than submarines, and from airplanes other than heavy bombers. This is an exception from paragraph 8 mentioned above.

Comment. This article presumes certain exceptions from the provisions set forth in paragraph 8 of Article V. Taking into consideration that the provisions indicated in paragraph 8 of Article V are excluded from the Russian draft of the

treaty, (sic)

Paragraph 10.

a ban on equipping, testing and deploying:

- Nuclear weapons, on aircraft other than airplanes, but which have a range exceeding 8,000 kilometers;
- Nuclear weapons on airplanes other than heavy bombers, but which satisfy the requirements for heavy bombers in terms of size and range;
- Long range nuclear ALCMs located on all aircraft other than airplanes, or on airplanes other than heavy bombers, but which satisfy the requirements for heavy bombers in terms of size and range.

Comment. The Russian version of the new agreement provides that the question of all newly developed weapons, which, in the opinion of the other side, can be SOAs are subject of discussion in the BCC.

Paragraph 12.

a ban on deploying SOAs and support equipment at eliminated facilities.

Comment. Eliminated facilities may not be used for purposes inconsistent with the treaty on SOAs.

In this connection it is supposed that all SOAs, training models of missiles, training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, launch associated transport support vehicles, and transport vehicles for driver training will be removed from such a facility.

End text.

14. (U) Gottemoeller sends.  
GRIFFITHS